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ABSTRACT:	  This article sets out two case studies to examine the evolving reality of ‘boat 
migration’ and the intersecting legal frameworks at play. Our analysis takes a systemic 
integration approach to reflect on the complex dynamics underpinning responses to the 
phenomenon in Australia and the Central Mediterranean. The regime that governments 
purport to act under in any given instance reflects the way they choose to frame incidents and 
possibly exploit legal gaps in, or contested interpretations of, the relevant rules. The ‘closed 
ports’ strategy adopted by Italy and Malta against the MV Lifeline and the detention-at-sea 
policy pursued by Australia are investigated from the competing perspectives of what we call 
the ‘security lens’ and the ‘humanitarian lens’ to demonstrate how a good faith interpretation 
of the applicable (if apparently conflicting and overlapping) norms can (and should) be 
mobilised to save lives, and how that goal is unduly undercut when security concerns trump 
humanitarian interests. 
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1. Introduction 
In today’s globalized world, ‘boat migration’ has become an especially hazardous form of 
trans-border movement, with the decline in the seaworthiness of vessels, the conditions on 
board, and the safety of the sea routes.1 Over the last five years, it has been estimated that 
11,400 people have perished in their attempts to cross the Mediterranean.2 Other notable 
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1 For an overview of the phenomenon, see V. Moreno-Lax and E. Papastavridis (eds), ‘Boat Refugees’ and 
Migrants at Sea: A Comprehensive Approach (Brill, 2016). 
2 Missing Migrants, 16 August 2018, <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean>. 
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‘boat migration’ pathways are in the waters north of Australia,3 and in the Andaman Sea.4 
Across regions, ‘boat migrants’ have been singled out for particularly harsh treatment, as 
demonstrated by Italy’s current refusals to allow rescue ships to dock, forcing them to voyage 
to other countries for safe harbour,5 and by Australia’s ‘brutal model’ of offshore interdiction 
and push-back at sea.6  
Against this background, it is vital to assess the approaches of different coastal States 
against their international legal obligations and understand how different policy lenses are 
influencing the interpretation and application of binding commitments. In so doing, we intend 
to demonstrate how countries could better adhere to all applicable international duties 
(simultaneously) when it becomes necessary to save lives at sea, without adopting a self-help, 
‘pick and chose’ approach. 
This article sets out two case studies to examine this evolving reality and the legal 
frameworks that apply. Our analysis reflects the complex dynamics underpinning the 
decisions and responses to the phenomenon. We particularly seek to highlight the difficulties 
generated by the intersection of different regimes—and their solipsistic construal—including: 
law enforcement under the law of the sea; search and rescue requirements; human rights; and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See A. Schloenhardt and C. Craig, ‘Turning Back the Boats: Australia’s Interdiction of Irregular Migrants at 
Sea’, (2015) 27 IJRL 536; Phillips, ‘Boat Arrivals and Boat “Turnbacks” in Australia since 1976: A Quick 
Guide to the Statistics’, 17 January 2017 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/about_parliament/parliamentary_departments/parliamentary_library/pubs/rp/rp1617/q
uick_guides/boatturnbacks>. 
4 B.N. Ghráinne, 'Left to Die at Sea: State Responsibility for the May 2015 Thai, Indonesian and Malaysian 
Pushback Operations', (2015) 10 The Irish Yearbook of International Law 109. 
5 See, e.g., ‘Italy wants 629 migrants rescued near Libya to disembark in Malta, says its own ports “closed”’, 
Malta Independent, 10 June 2018 <http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2018-06-10/local-news/Italy-wants-
629-migrants-rescued-near-Libya-to-disembark-in-Malta-says-its-own-ports-closed-6736191445>; ‘Spain offers 
to take in Aquarius ship carrying over 600 refugees’, Al Jazeera, 11 June 2018 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/spain-offers-aquarius-ship-carrying-600-refugees-
180611133533958.html>; and ‘Rescue Boat Open Arms Arrives in Sport Port with 87 Migrants’, Reuters, 9 
August 2018 <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-spain/rescue-boat-open-arms-arrives-in-
spanish-port-with-87-migrants-aboard-idUKKBN1KU1H0>.   
6 ‘The West’s War on Refugees’, Gulf News, 17 July 2018 <https://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/the-west-s-
war-on-refugees-1.2253034>; See also, D. Ghezelbash, Refuge Lost: Asylum Law in an Interdependent World 
(CUP, 2018), ch 7; D. Ghezelbash, ‘Forces of Diffusion: What Drives the Transfer of Immigration Policy and 
Law Across Jurisdictions?’ (2014) 1 IJMBS 139. 
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refugee law principles. The regime governments purport to act under in a given instance 
reflects the way they choose to frame an issue and possibly exploit legal gaps in, or contested 
interpretations of, the relevant international obligations. 
Our case studies show how the law is interpreted (or instrumentalised) in response 
to specific incidents of ‘boat migration’. First, we assess the legality of State action to 
migration across the Central Mediterranean, particularly between Italy and Libya, and 
highlight the resulting treatment of the MV Lifeline, which was turned away from a Maltese 
port on the basis that a contended rescue had occurred in Libya’s self-declared rescue zone 
and that Italy’s rescue authorities had directed the vessel to port in Libya. Second, we 
examine one of the very few instances of Australia’s response to migrants at sea that has 
details in the public domain, concerning SIEV 885 and the accompanying CPCF litigation.7 
The case-study incidents involve different factual scenarios dealing with the application of 
discrete norms and principles of international law. The purpose of the comparative analysis is 
not to contrast the implementation of specific legal commitments in detail, but rather to lay 
bare more general commonalities in the way the governments in each jurisdiction (dis-
)engage with their obligations under different (but concurrently applicable) international 
regimes.  
Overall, we argue that the legal justification for the securitised response to each of 
the case-study incidents involved the cherry-picking of self-serving elements by the States 
concerned, while ignoring others that may have led to a contrary conclusion as to the legality 
of government actions. Such an approach—we posit—risks the further fragmentation of 
international law.8 And it erodes the pacta sunt servanda basis underpinning the entire 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 255 CLR 514. 
8 For discussion of the problems of fragmentation, see International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, Report of 
the Study Group of the International Law Commission Finalised by Martti Koskenniemi, (2006) A/CN.4/L.682. 
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system, according to which ‘[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must 
be performed by them in good faith’.9 In advocating a more humanitarian-focused approach, 
we rely on a process of systemic integration, which aims to reconcile the different legal 
regimes at play.10 This approach is consistent with Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, which requires that account be taken of ‘any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ in the interpretation of a 
State’s treaty obligations,11 and it honours the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) commitment to a holistic understanding of states’ maritime powers that takes 
account of ‘other rules of international law’.12 
Prior to our case study analyses, we thus situate the relevant regimes in Section 2. 
The case studies then disclose how these operated, or should have operated, in specific 
examples in Sections 3 and 4. Through these case studies we confront the preponderant 
‘security lens’, currently dominating state responses, to the (more comprehensive) 
‘humanitarian lens’ advocated here, to show how a different outcome would have been 
reached for the migrants concerned, if a good faith reading of the law had been utilised 
compared to that actually employed. In light of the experiences of MV Lifeline and SIEV 885, 
we conclude, in Section 5, that states following a selective approach of the applicable rules 
are actually in violation of their international legal obligations; they do not account for all 
relevant factors and principles in their decision-making. At the systemic level, this failure 
threatens the normative integrity of the legal regimes applicable to ‘boat migration’ and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
See also N. Klein, ‘A Case for Harmonizing Laws on Maritime Interceptions of Irregular Migrants’, (2014) 63 
ICLQ 787, 803-804. 
9 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Art 26. For analysis, see, 
generally, R. Kolb, Good Faith in International Law (Hart, 2017). 
10 For a concrete proposal and further references, see V. Moreno-Lax, ‘Systematising Systemic Integration: 
“War Refugees”, Regime Relations, and a Proposal for a Cumulative Approach to International Commitments’, 
(2014) 12 JICJ 907. See also Klein (n 8), 807-13. 
11 VCLT, Art 31(3)(c). See also P. Merkouris, Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration 
(Brill, 2015). 
12 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’), 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, Arts 2(3) and 87(1). 
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needlessly imperils the lives of many. Rescue, taken as part of the most ‘elementary 
considerations of humanity’,13 constituting ‘a manifestation of…the universal juridical 
conscience’ of humankind,14 provides the normative grounding substantiating this 
conclusion. Ultimately, our purpose is to demonstrate how a good faith interpretation of the 
relevant legal frameworks can (and should) be mobilised to save lives, and how that goal is 
undermined when national security concerns trump or ignore humanitarian interests. 
Focusing on ‘boat migration’ as a laboratory in two separate jurisdictions, we thereby aim to 
contribute to the broader literature on systemic integration.15  
2. Legal Frameworks Applicable to Boat Migration 
Migration by sea is regulated under international law and especially pursuant to international 
treaties, which states have implemented to varying degrees. This section focuses on the 
foundational texts that may concurrently apply in maritime contexts. It first addresses the law 
of the sea and the rights and duties that accrue to states for law enforcement purposes. It then 
considers the legal regime established for search and rescue under the auspices of the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Finally, it sets out key human rights principles 
that cut across regimes, and relevant dimensions of international refugee law. 
2.1 Law of the sea and law enforcement 
UNCLOS establishes the primary rights and obligations of states in relation to different 
maritime areas. The greater the proximity of the maritime area to land the greater the rights of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), [1949] ICJ Rep. 4, 22, para. 215; and Case Concerning Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, 112-
114, paras 215 and 218. See, generally, P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Les “considérations élémentaires de l’humanité” dans la 
jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale de Justice’, in R.J. Dupuy and L.A. Sicilianos (eds), Mélanges en 
l’honneur de N. Valticos – Droit et justice (Pédone, 1999). 
14 A.A. Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind (Brill, 2013), at 394. 
15 See, e.g., B. Simma and D. Pulkowski, ‘Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in International 
Law’ (2006) 17 EJIL 483; C. McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 279; D. French, ‘Treaty Interpretation and The Incorporation Of 
Extraneous Legal Rules’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 281; G. Orellana Zabalza, The Principle of Systemic Integration (LIT 
Verlag, 2012); D. Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict (OUP, 2014). 
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the coastal state in the area concerned. A coastal state exercises sovereignty over its territorial 
sea, which may extend up to 12 NM from the state’s baselines.16 However, the coastal state’s 
sovereignty over its territorial sea is not unlimited and is to be exercised in conformity with 
UNCLOS and ‘other rules of international law’.17  
Among others, state powers are subject to the right of innocent passage enjoyed by 
‘ships of all states’.18 This right allows for continuous cruising through a state’s territorial 
sea, including for the purpose of proceeding from or to a port facility.19 However, the loading 
or unloading of any persons in violation of a coastal state’s customs or immigration laws may 
constitute an infringement of the right of innocent passage.20 But, as further discussed in 
Section 3, there are some caveats, including that passage shall not be impeded in cases 
where it is rendered necessary due to force majeure, distress, danger, or in order to render 
assistance to persons or vessels in peril.21  
Beyond the territorial sea, the coastal state has authority within its contiguous zone 
to exercise the control necessary to prevent violations of its immigration laws ‘within its 
territory or territorial sea’ and has also the power to punish any infringement thereof—but 
only if ‘committed within its territory or territorial sea’.22 This limited capacity to prevent and 
prosecute responds to the fact that, for all other means and purposes, the contiguous zone lies 
on the high seas, extending up to 24 NM from the coastline,23 over which no state can claim 
sovereignty.24  The freedoms associated with the high seas attach to ‘all states’,25 including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 UNCLOS, Art 2. 
17 UNCLOS, Art 2(3). 
18 UNCLOS, Art 17. 
19 UNCLOS, Art 18(1)(a) and (b). 
20 UNCLOS, Art 19(2)(g).  
21 UNCLOS, Art 18(2). 
22 UNCLOS, Art 33. 
23 Ibid. 
24 UNCLOS, Art 89. 
25 UNCLOS, Art 87. 
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the right of navigation.26 In this area, the principle of exclusive flag-state jurisdiction 
applies.27 Therefore, coastal states have no specific rights over foreign-flagged vessels, in 
respect of migration or otherwise, unless the flag state expressly consents to it.28 
With regard to vessels without nationality29—typically the situation of migrant 
boats—there is a special ‘right of visit’ to undertake a vérification du pavillon, including on 
board the ship. Commentators have taken different positions on what powers may be 
exercised over a stateless vessel and those on board.30 UNCLOS does not explicitly provide 
for a right to seize, arrest, or detain in relation to stateless vessels.31 Thus, in the absence of 
an express basis, it may be inferred that the default rule of freedom of navigation continues to 
apply.32 Whatever the case, the human rights obligations of officials visiting the stateless 
vessel remain applicable, as part of the ‘other rules of international law’ binding on the high 
seas discussed further below.33 
States party to the 2000 Migrant Smuggling Protocol may also have authority to 
board and search vessels flagged to other states party to the Protocol pursuant to the terms of 
that treaty.34 The Protocol requires all state parties to criminalize migrant smuggling and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 UNCLOS, Art 90. 
27 UNCLOS, Art 92(1). 
28 See UNCLOS, Art 110. Another exception is the right of hot pursuit: UNCLOS, Art 111. 
29 A vessel is stateless if it is not flagged to, or registered in, any particular state. In such case, it does not enjoy 
the protection of any particular state. See UNCLOS, Arts 91 and 92.   
30 One view is that statelessness creates a legal vacuum allowing a boarding state to assert its laws and 
enforcement jurisdiction over the vessel: D. Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction on the Law of the Sea (CUP, 2009) 
341–2; A. Dastyari, United States Migrant Interdiction and the Detention of Refugees in Guantánamo Bay 
(CUP, 2015) 79–82. A second view is that statelessness in itself is not enough, and there must be some sort of 
jurisdictional nexus in order to enliven enforcement powers: E. Papastavridis, The Interception of Vessels on the 
High Seas (Hart, 2013) 264–7; J. Coppens, ‘Interception of Migrant Boats at Sea’, in Moreno-Lax and 
Papastavridis (n 1) 209. 
31 UNCLOS, Art 110. Cf. UNCLOS, Art 107, expressly conferring powers of ‘seizure on account of piracy’ on 
warships or military aircraft of any state. 
32 Cf. Dastyari (n 30) and Guilfoyle (n 30). 
33 UNCLOS, Art 87(1). In addition, the nationality of those on board may give a basis for a state to exercise its 
right of diplomatic protection. This right accrues to the state rather than the individual, who only enjoys a right 
to consular assistance. See LaGrand (Germany v. United States), [2001] ICJ Rep. 466. As a result, human rights 
protections remain paramount.  
34 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (‘Smuggling Protocol’), 2241 U.N.T.S. 480, Art 8(7). 
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related acts ‘when committed intentionally and in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit’.35 In such cases, Article 8 of the Protocol allows a warship 
with reasonable grounds to suspect that a foreign-flagged ship is engaged in illegal migrant 
smuggling to request the consent of the flag state and take ‘appropriate measures’ against that 
ship, ‘as authorised by the flag state’. The same applies to stateless vessels, without any prior 
consent being required, but subject to the ‘appropriate measures’ being adopted ‘in 
accordance with relevant … international law’.36 There is, however, no consensus as to 
whether the ‘appropriate measures’ provision provides proper legal grounding to detain the 
ship and/or the persons on board, especially if human rights guarantees are taken into 
account.37 
In fact, the Protocol does seek to ensure the compatibility of anti-smuggling 
provisions with international human rights law, introducing in Article 16 an obligation on 
states to respect the rights and protect those who are the object of smuggling operations, 
affording ‘appropriate assistance’ and ‘protection against violence’, focusing in particular on 
preserving ‘the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment’.38 A savings clause, Article 19(1), further stipulates 
that the Protocol leave international commitments under other instruments of human rights 
and refugee law, and especially the principle of non-refoulement, intact. 
States may further enter into regional or bilateral agreements that provide for 
additional policing powers against each other’s vessels or in each other’s territorial sea, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Smuggling Protocol, Art 6. States may also become parties to the Trafficking Protocol, which can also form 
the basis for action at sea where there are victims of human trafficking: 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime (‘Trafficking Protocol’), 2237 U.N.T.S. 319. For discussion, see 
Guilfoyle (n 30), 226-31.  
36 Smuggling Protocol, Art 8(7). 
37 See V. Moreno-Lax, ‘Seeking Asylum in the Mediterranean: Against a Fragmentary Reading of EU Member 
States' Obligations Accruing at Sea’, (2011) 23 IJRL 174, 188-9 and references therein to ECtHR, Medvedyev v. 
France, Appl. 3394/03, 29 March 2010, where the Court concluded a similarly worded provision in the Vienna 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs to be insufficient to warrant a measure of deprivation of liberty. 
38 Smuggling Protocol, Art 8(1)-(3). 
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consistent with the core rights and duties recognised in UNCLOS.39 Such a bilateral 
agreement between Italy and Libya is discussed below in relation to MV Lifeline. 
2.2 Search and rescue regime 
Notable in relation to law enforcement powers under the law of the sea is that there remains 
an expectation that human rights obligations or obligations derived from other international 
agreements will continue to operate,40 including those on search and rescue (SAR). The SAR 
regime comprises the core obligations under UNCLOS, as well as requirements enshrined in 
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and the Search and Rescue (SAR) 
Convention.41 The IMO has also developed Guidelines to assist states in the interpretation 
and application of their responsibilities under these treaties.42 
Under UNCLOS, states are to require the masters of their ships to ‘render 
assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost’ and to ‘proceed with all possible 
speed to the rescue of persons in distress’.43 However, a master is not required to seriously 
endanger the ship, its crew or passengers, nor do more than may ‘reasonably be expected of 
him’.44 Coastal states have, in addition, the obligation to ‘promote the establishment, 
operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service’ as a 
permanent structure to secure ‘safety on and over the sea’.45 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 For discussion on these sort of agreements, see Guilfoyle (n 30) 189-191; 196; 209-10; 219; E. Papastavridis 
‘Interception of Human Beings on the High Seas: A Contemporary Analysis under International Law’, (2009) 
36 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 145, 178-87. 
40 UNCLOS, Preamble: ‘matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and 
principles of general international law’. See also Art 2(3) (territorial sea) and Art 87(1) (high seas). 
41 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (‘SOLAS Convention’), 1184 U.N.T.S. 278; 1979 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (‘SAR Convention’), 1405 U.N.T.S. 119. 
42 IMO, Maritime Safety Committee, Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea (‘IMO 
Guidelines’), (2004) MSC.167(78), MSC 78/26/Add.2 (Annex 34). 
43 UNCLOS, Art 98(1). 
44 UNCLOS, Art 98(1)(b). 
45 UNCLOS, Art 98(2) (emphasis added). 
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Besides UNCLOS, the SOLAS Convention imposes an obligation on shipmasters 
‘to proceed with all speed to the assistance of … persons in distress’.46 Similarly, the SAR 
Convention requires parties to participate in the development of SAR services ‘to ensure that 
assistance is rendered to any person in distress at sea’.47 Under both the SAR and SOLAS 
Conventions, the obligation to assist applies ‘regardless of the nationality or status of such 
persons or the circumstances in which they are found’—thus including migrants in an 
irregular situation.48 Moreover, the SOLAS Convention requires the master to treat rescuees 
‘with humanity, within the capabilities and limitations of the ship’.49 
The obligation to assist is put in operation through the establishment of SAR 
regions and rescue coordination centres. Each SAR region is to be determined through 
agreement between the parties concerned,50 and, ‘as far as practicable, should not overlap’.51 
SAR services are defined as ‘the performance of distress monitoring, communication, co-
ordination and search and rescue functions, including provision of medical advice … 
assistance or … evacuation, through the use of public and private resources …’.52  
During the course of a SAR operation, it is the state responsible for the SAR region 
that has ‘primary responsibility’ to ensure survivors are disembarked from the assisting ship 
and ‘delivered to a place of safety’.53 None of UNCLOS, the SOLAS or the SAR Convention 
provisions explicitly requires a state to accept the disembarkation of rescuees onto their 
territory. And, as the case studies will illustrate, in deciding on a place for disembarkation, 
the term ‘place of safety’ has proven difficult to define. 
2.3 Human rights and refugee law 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 SOLAS Convention, Annex, Ch 5, Reg 33(1). 
47 SAR Convention, Annex, para. 2.1.1. 
48 SOLAS Convention, Annex, Ch 5, Reg 33(1); SAR Convention, Annex, para. 2.1.10. 
49 SOLAS Convention, Amendment, MSC 78/26/Add.1, Annex 3, inserting new para. 6. 
50 SAR Convention, Annex, para. 2.1.4.  
51 SAR Convention, Annex, para. 2.1.3. 
52 SAR Convention, Annex, para. 1.3.3. 
53 SAR Convention, Annex, para. 3.1.9. 
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Beyond entitlements to assistance under the SAR regime, migrants are holders of human 
rights protections under international treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),54 and the Convention against Torture (CAT).55 In particular, the 
obligation of non-refoulement prevents any person who may be at risk of being subjected to 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment from being sent to a 
particular country.56 Other human rights violations that may occur during maritime operations 
include infringements of the rights to life and physical integrity,57 the prohibition of arbitrary 
detention, collective expulsion,58 and denial of an effective remedy.59 In addition, if a ‘boat 
migrant’ claims to be a refugee, she or he is entitled to have that claim assessed,60 and the 
various protections flowing from the Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol become relevant 
as well, as the case studies below demonstrate.61 In fact, as the European Court of Human 
Rights has clarified, ‘States’ legitimate concern to foil the increasingly frequent attempts to 
circumvent immigration restrictions must not deprive asylum-seekers of the protection 
afforded by these conventions’,62 in particular, their ‘right to gain effective access to the 
procedure for determining refugee status’.63  
Debate has previously emerged as to the applicability of human rights and refugee 
law principles at sea.64 The relevant test in extraterritorial contexts is whether the state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
55 1984 Convention against Torture (‘CAT’), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
56 Ibid., Art 3. Art 7 ICCPR has also been interpreted to similar effect. HRC, ‘General Comment No. 20: Article 
7’, (1994) HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 30, para. 9. 
57 HRC, ‘General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), on the right to life’, (2018) CCPR/C/GC/36. 
58 1998 Protocol No. 4 to the [ECHR], E.T.S. 46, Art 4. 
59 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’), E.T.S. 005, Art 13. 
60 This right is implicit in the obligation of non-refoulement: V. Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe 
(OUP, 2017) chs 8, 9 and 10; Papastavridis (n 30) 217. 
61 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’), 189 U.N.T.S. 150, Art 1(A)(2); 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Protocol’), 606 U.N.T.S. 267, Art 1(2).  
62 ECtHR, Amuur v. France, Appl. 19776/92, 25 June 1996, para. 43. 
63 Ibid. See also ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Appl. 30696/09, 21 January 2011, paras 216, 313, and 
321. 
64 See, e.g., N. Klein, ‘Assessing Australia’s Push Back the Boats Policy under International Law: Legality and 
Accountability for Maritime Interceptions of Irregular Migrants’ (2014) 15 MJIL 414; D. Ghezelbash et al., 
‘Securitization of Search and Rescue at Sea: The Response to Boat Migration in the Mediterranean and Offshore 
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exercises jurisdiction qua ‘effective control’ over an area or person abroad.65 This standard 
applies in relation to the ICCPR,66 the CAT,67 and the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).68 Once state authorities exercise control over a migrant vessel or the 
individuals on board—which may be ‘contactless control’ if nonetheless effective69—human 
rights obligations attach and must be observed.  
While the legal framework available can thus support the humanitarian dimensions 
of helping ‘boat migrants’ in danger at sea, the rights’ perspective has not necessarily 
prevailed in practice over the law enforcement and security concerns intended to protect 
national borders. The next section discloses how European coastal states in the Central 
Mediterranean have responded to recent SAR events, adopting a ‘closed ports’ strategy that 
criminalizes humanitarian rescues undertaken by civil society. The ongoing case of the MV 
Lifeline is particularly illustrative in this regard.  
3. The Central Mediterranean ‘Closed Ports’ Strategy: The MV Lifeline Case  
The MV Lifeline is a Dutch-flagged vessel operated by the NGO Mission Lifeline.70 It was 
initially denied access to a Maltese port despite being in distress following the rescue of 234 
people. As discussed in this section, the incident may be seen as a catalyst for the new ‘closed 
ports’ policy adopted by Italy and Malta. We first provide the general context, before 
detailing the situation of the MV Lifeline. The final objective is to assess state action through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Australia’ (2018) 67 ICLQ 315; V. Moreno-Lax, The Interdiction of Asylum Seekers at Sea: Law and 
(Mal)practice in Europe and Australia, Kaldor Centre Policy Brief No 4 (UNSW, 2017). 
65 For a monographic elaboration, see Moreno-Lax (n 60). 
66 HRC, ‘General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant’, (2004) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 10. Cf. HRC, General Comment No. 36 (n 57), paras 22 and 
63, speaking rather of ‘a direct and reasonably foreseeable impact on the right[s] … of individuals’ alongside 
‘effective control’ as a trigger of extraterritorial responsibility. For further commentary, see V. Moreno-Lax and 
M. Lemberg-Pedersen, ‘Border-Induced Displacement: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Distance-Creation 
through Externalization’ (2019) 56 QIL 5.  
67 CAT Committee, ‘Concluding Observations: United States of America’, (2006) CAT/C/USA/C/2, para. 20.  
68 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Appl. 27765/09, 23 February 2012, para. 73. 
69 V. Moreno-Lax and M. Giuffré, ‘The Rise of Consensual Containment: From “Contactless Control” to 
“Contactless Responsibility” for Forced Migration Flows’, in S. Juss (ed.), Research Handbook on International 
Refugee Law (forthcoming) <http://www.unhcr.org/5a056ca07.pdf>. 
70 Mission Lifeline <https://www.betterplace.org/en/projects/46977-mission-lifeline-search-and-rescue>. 
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a security and a humanitarian lens to bring to light alternative approaches to the legal 
frameworks, providing guidance on how states could better adhere to their international 
obligations. 
3.1 Towards ‘Mare Clausum’71 
The situation in the Central Mediterranean has been problematic for a number of years. 
Attempts to close it as an access route for ‘boat migrants’ date back to the early 2000s,72 
culminating in the conclusion of the 2008 Treaty of Friendship between the Gaddafi and 
Berlusconi governments.73 Article 19 of that Treaty calls on both parties to intensify their 
collaboration in the fight against irregular migration and to promote the establishment of an 
integrated system of border control in Libya, for Italian actors with the required technological 
competence to administer it, and committing Italy to pay 50% of the cost, with the EU 
bearing the other 50%. Paragraph 3 of this provision commits parties to jointly define 
initiatives to ‘stem irregular migration flows’. It was under these terms that the 2009 ‘push-
back’ campaign was conducted, through joint patrolling operations leading to the interception 
and return of migrant boats to Libya, which the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights condemned in Hirsi.74  
The Treaty had been ‘dormant’ throughout the period of the Arab Spring and 
ensuing war in Libya.75 But on 2nd February 2017, a Memorandum of Understanding was 
concluded with the UN-backed Government of National Accord ‘reviving’ it, with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 C. Heller and L. Pezzani, ‘Mare Clausum: Italy and the EU’s Undeclared Operation to Stem Migration across 
the Mediterranean’, Forensic Oceanography (2018) <http://www.forensic-architecture.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/2018-05-07-FO-Mare-Clausum-full-EN.pdf>.    
72 For a detailed reconstruction, see E. Paoletti, The Migration of Power and North-South Inequalities: The Case 
of Italy and Libya (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
73 Trattato di Amicizia, Partenariato e Cooperazione tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Grande Giamahiria Araba 
Libica Popolare Socialista, 30 August 2008 <https://tinyurl.com/yccpuktb>.   
74 Hirsi (n 68). 
75 But see persisting links throughout that period, according to Statewatch: ‘Documents unveil post-Gaddafi 
cooperation agreement on immigration’ (September, 2012) <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/sep/01italy-
libya-immigration-cooperation.html>. 
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specific purpose of implementing Article 19 of the agreement.76 This is how Italy has been 
invested in the re-establishment of the Libyan Coast Guard (LYCG), including through the 
equipment, financing, and training of its officials. Italy has donated the four main assets of 
the LYCG and plans for an extra six patrol boats to be gifted to enhance Libyan capacity to 
coordinate maritime interventions autonomously.77 
For the time being, the LYCG has been incapable of operating at a ‘self-sustaining 
level’, lacking the ‘capacity for the minimum level of execution of command and control, 
including that necessary to coordinate SAR/SOLAS events’.78 This is why the Italian military 
mission NAURAS, an extension of the Mare Sicuro Operation, active since 2015,79 was 
launched in August 2017.80 It consists of four ships, four helicopters, and 600 servicemen, of 
which 70% are deployed at sea, with the other 30% stationed in Tripoli harbour.81 Their key 
mission is precisely to create the operational conditions and develop the command-and-
control capabilities for the LYCG to become autonomous.82 Moreover, the Italian Navy has 
assets in Libya to act as the Libyan Navy Communication Centre and main ‘logistic 
assistance/support hub’.83 Since deployment, an Italian warship has played the role of a 
floating Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (‘MRCC’) in Libya, with the specific function 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Memorandum of Understanding of 2 February 2017 (English translation) <http://www.asgi.it/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/ITALY-LIBYA-MEMORANDUM-02.02.2017.pdf>. 
77 ‘Italy gives Libya four patrol boats to help fight illegal immigration’, The Local, 16 May 2017 
<https://www.thelocal.it/20170516/italy-gives-libya-four-patrol-boats-to-bolster-coastguard>. See also 
European Commission, ‘EU Trust Fund for Africa adopts €46 million programme to support integrated 
migration and border management in Libya’, Press Release, 28 July 2017 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-2187_en.htm>. 
78 EUNAVFOR MED Op Sophia - Monitoring of Libyan Coast Guard and Navy Report October 2017 - January 
2018, Council doc. 6961/18 EU Restricted, 9 March 2018  (on file with the authors), 24 and 26. 
79 ‘Operazione Mare Sicuro’, Ministero della Difesa, 12 March 2015 
<https://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/NazionaliInCorso/MareSicuro/Pagine/default.aspx>. See also ‘Italy 
launches Mare Sicuro to monitor Libya’s coastline’, Marsad, 30 March 2015 
<https://www.marsad.ly/en/2015/03/30/italy-launches-mare-sicuro-to-monitor-libyas-coastline/>.    
80 ‘Il decreto che autorizza la nuova missione navale in Libia’, Analisi Difesa, 31 July 2017 
<https://www.analisidifesa.it/2017/07/il-decreto-che-autorizza-la-nuova-missione-navale-in-libia/>. 
81 Operation Mare Sicuro, Marina Militare Italiana, SHADE MED Presentation, Rome 23-24 November 2017. 
See also EUNAVFOR MED Op SOPHIA - Six Monthly Report 1 June - 30 November 2017, Council doc. 
16013/17 EU Restricted, 22 December 2017 (on file with the authors). 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid.  
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of assuming ‘the cooperation and coordination of the joint activities of the Libyan Coast 
Guard and Navy, with a view to carrying out their command-and-control tasks’.84 It is 
‘thanks’ to the Italian Navy, rather than to independent action by Libya,85 that the LYCG has 
performed 19,452 pullbacks in 2017,86 arguably on Italy’s behalf, for Italy’s benefit, and via 
its pivotal support.87 This level of control is clearly sufficient to trigger the extraterritorial 
application of the ECHR to ensure that Italy respects human rights obligations at sea.88 
Equally, this ‘effective control’ has been found to engage the ICCPR and the CAT in relation 
to state conduct at sea.89 Italy, however, denies any connection to LYCG’s conduct, thereby 
disclaiming the applicability of its human rights obligations.90  
Since the change of government in March 2018, Italy’s stance to maritime 
migration has toughened considerably. Although the number of crossings has fallen by 78% 
compared to the previous year,91 drawing on electoral promises,92 Interior Minister Salvini 
has set a ‘zero arrivals’ target.93 This is to be achieved through a twofold strategy: closing 
ports to vessels rescuing migrants and discrediting SAR NGOs as ‘aiding people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Relazione analitica sulle missioni internazionali in corso e sullo stato degli interventi di cooperazione allo 
sviluppo a sostegno dei processi di pace e di stabilizzazione, deliberata dal Consiglio dei ministri il 28 dicembre 
2017, DOC. CCL-bis, N. 1, Scheda 36, 101 <http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/1063681.pdf>.  
85 ECtHR, Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, Appl. 13216/05, 16 June 2015, para. 178. 
86 IOM, Libya—Maritime Incidents Update (25 October—28 November 2017) 
<https://displacement.iom.int/reports/libya-—-maritime-incidents-update-25-october-—-28-november>. 
87 The Politico revelations come in support of this affirmation. See Z. Campbell, ‘Europe’s Deadly Migration 
Strategy: Officials knew EU military operation made Mediterranean crossing more dangerous’, Politico, 28 
February 2019 <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-deadly-migration-strategy-leaked-documents/>.  
88 Jurisdiction under Art 1 ECHR is a threshold criterion that must be met to ‘activate’ ECHR obligations. The 
relevant standard in extraterritorial circumstances is ‘effective control’, which departs from connotations under 
general international law. For an elaboration, see M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties (OUP, 2011).   
89 (nn 66-67) and accompanying text. See also CATCom, J.H.A. v. Spain, Comm. 323/ 2007, 10 Nov. 2008, 
para. 8.2; and CATCom, Sonko v. Spain, Comm. 368/ 2008, 20 Feb. 2012, para. 10.3. 
90 Cf. ECtHR, S.S. and Others v. Italy, Appl. 21660/18 (pending); and C.O. and A.J. v. Italy, Appl. 40396/18 
(pending).  
91 ‘Over 27,000 migrants to Europe by sea in 2018, 636 victims’, ANSA, 24 May 2018 (citing IOM figures) 
<http://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/9447/over-27-000-migrants-to-europe-by-sea-in-2018-636-victims>.  
92 See Lega Nord’s manifesto for 2018 Elections 
<https://www.leganord.org/component/phocadownload/category/5-elezioni?download=1514:programma-lega-
salvini-premier-2018>.  
93 ‘Salvini vows to end all migrant arrivals to Italy by boat’, The Local, 6 July 2018, 
<https://www.thelocal.it/20180706/matteo-salvini-migrant-arrivals-boat>.  
16 
traffickers’.94 In turn, pressure on Malta to accept disembarkations has increased as a result, 
leading both countries to complicated standoffs over responsibility for the survivors.95 
One such standoff sparked on account of the MV Lifeline, flying the Dutch flag and 
operated by the German SAR NGO Mission Lifeline. The vessel was carrying 234 migrants 
rescued between Libya and Lampedusa on 20 June 2018.96 Apparently, the captain intervened 
of his own motion, responding to a distress situation he had witnessed and then informing the 
Italian MRCC of the rescue. Rome assigned a SAR case number and initially coordinated the 
operation, but it soon informed that the LYCG had ‘taken over’ and assumed responsibility 
for the indication of a ‘place of safety’97—despite it lacking its own MRCC, being fully 
dependent on Italian instructions and support, and that LYCG interventions happen ‘under 
the aegis of the Italian navy’.98 
Considering Tripoli an unsuitable port of disembarkation,99 in line with the widely 
documented cases of persecution, ill treatment, and enslavement of migrants throughout 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 ‘For the first time, Italy prevents a private Italian ship from docking with rescued migrants’, The Local, 10 
July 2018, <https://www.thelocal.it/20180710/italy-turns-away-private-italian-ship-vos-thalassa-rescued-
migrants-libya>.   
95 The first such standoff since Salvini took office regards the MV Aquarius, jointly operated by Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) and SAR NGO SOS Méditerranée, denied disembarkation both by Italy and Malta, with 
Spain stepping in several days after, granting permission to land in Valencia, 842 NM away from the vessel’s 
location. See ‘Italy fires a fresh warning as migrants sing and pray on stranded ship’, The Times of Malta, 11 
June 2018 <https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20180611/local/migrants-sing-and-pray-aboard-ship-
as-governments-argue-about-their.681443?utm_source=tom&utm_campaign=top5&utm_medium=widget>; 
‘Malta offers medical assistance to migrants’ ship – Muscat’, The Times of Malta, 11 June 2018, 
<https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20180611/local/malta-offers-medical-assistance-to-migrants-ship-
muscat.681484>; ‘Updated (6): Spain lets migrants' ship dock in Valencia; we cannot let this happen again – 
Muscat’, Malta Independent, 11 June 2018, <http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2018-06-11/local-
news/Migrants-stranded-Malta-says-Italy-going-against-international-rules-6736191457>.     
96 ‘Malta Says Not Responsible For Lifeline Boat Denied By Italy’, Malaysian Digest, 23 June 2018, 
<http://malaysiandigest.com/world/743877-malta-says-not-responsible-for-lifeline-boat-denied-by-italy.html>.    
97 Exchange of emails between MV Lifeline and Rome MRCC (on file with authors).   
98 See decision by the judge of Catania adjudicating on the related case of MV Open Arms, Tribunale di Catania, 
27 March 18, at 22 <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2018/apr/it-open-arms-sequestration-judicial-order-
tribunale-catania.pdf>.   
99 Although the LYCG did not immediately reply to requests from the MV Lifeline, on 25 June 2018, i.e. 4 days 
after the rescue, they indicated Tripoli as ‘place of safety’, where the survivors should be brought to, via email 
(on file with authors).  
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Libya,100 the captain gauged the risks and headed north instead, where ‘all ports of safety 
[were] located … from [the MV Lifeline’s] position’.101 Upon reaching the Maltese SRR—but 
staying out of the 24 NM of the contiguous zone, the captain contacted RCC Malta, 
considering Valetta their next port of call and on account of ‘difficulties with the weather 
[and] urgent medical case’, making the decision literally on ‘safety reasons’.102 Four 
members of the crew had become ill and all other members were highly stressed ‘after five 
days with nearly 250 people on board’.103 Weather conditions were worsening; small riots 
amongst rescuees broke out, augmenting the risk of persons falling over board.104 The captain 
then invoked his right to proceed to Valetta as port of refuge, deeming the situation on the 
MV Lifeline as one of distress.105   
Malta’s response was, however, unappreciative of the captain’s difficulties. It 
considered itself non-responsible for the SAR case, ‘having been carried out within the 
Libyan SRR’ and ‘with MRCC Rome being the first to intervene’.106 Moreover, it accused 
the captain of ‘reportedly ignor[ing] instructions of the responsible authority, i.e. the Libyan 
Coast Guard’.107 It recommended ‘to proceed closer to the authority responsible for issuing 
instructions on the Place of Safety’ and warned the captain that ‘RCC Malta will not bear any 
responsibility for any reckless decisions taken by [his] good self, including the disobedience 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 UNSMIL/OHCHR, ‘“Detained and Dehumanised” Report on Human Rights Abuses against Migrants in 
Libya, 13 December 2016 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/DetainedAndDehumanised_en.pdf>; UN Secretary-
General’s statement on reported news of slavery in Libya, 20 November 2017, 
<https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-11-20/secretary-general’s-statement-reported-news-
slavery-libya>; Amnesty International, Libya’s Dark Web of Collusion: Abuses against Europe-bound Refugees 
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africa/libya>. 
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to instructions of the coordinating and appropriate authorities’.108 It added that Maltese 
authorities ‘[were] reserving the right to formally address the Lifeline’s Flag State authorities 
for any appropriate action and investigation’ and reproached the captain for his ‘loitering’ 
and ‘unnecessarily and unduly endangering the life of those under [his] responsibility, 
contrary to the applicable conventions’.109 The solution, in their view, was to ‘await further 
instructions’ by the LYCG closer to Libya.110 
Ultimately, at an emergency summit, an ad hoc agreement was reached for the 
survivors to be distributed among eight EU Member States, with the ship being permitted to 
dock in Valetta.111 However, the captain was brought under investigation, accused of 
‘entering Maltese territorial waters illegally and without proper registration and a licence’, 
and the MV Lifeline was impounded.112  
Malta, like Italy, has since vowed to no longer allow migrant disembarkations.113 
This includes the withdrawal of landing rights to NGO aircrafts and ships, disallowing them 
not only to enter but also to leave Maltese ports, de facto impounding their assets.114 Over 
600 ‘boat migrants’ were reported dead off the coasts of Libya in the week following the 
introduction of the ‘closed ports’ strategy.115 And, in a final twist of the policy, Italy, for the 
first time, prevented a private, Italian-flagged commercial vessel, the Vos Thassala, from 
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112 ‘MV Lifeline captain charged with entering Maltese waters on unlicensed vessel, bail given’, Malta 
Independent, 2 July 2018 <http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2018-07-02/local-news/MV-Lifeline-
captain-arrives-in-court-for-hearing-6736192797>.  
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docking in Sicily with 66 rescued migrants on board.116 Interior Minister Salvini, labelling 
the Vos Thalassa’s intervention as ‘not necessary’, because the LYCG was in the vicinity,117 
announced he would also close Italy’s ports to ‘ships of international missions’ if they were 
carrying migrants, presumably including warships active within EUNAVFORMed Operation 
Sophia and Frontex-led Themis mission.118 
3.2 Security lens 
Italy and Malta have adopted a course fuelled by the anti-immigration rhetoric present in the 
national politics of both countries.119 This is despite the sharp decline in the amount of 
arrivals via the Central Mediterranean since the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015.120 Whether on 
grounds of fear, opportunism or something else, both countries portray ‘boat migration’ as an 
extreme national security and existential concern (whatever the numbers). This, in turn, is 
used to justify extreme policies that seek to completely shut down the maritime entry route. 
The closure of their ports, the criminal investigations conducted against the crew and/or 
captains of NGO vessels,121 and the seizure of their ships,122 all respond to this line of action. 
But can any of these measures be justified under international law? 
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A security lens would centre the assessment around the interdiction powers of 
coastal states and the near-plenary sovereignty they enjoy within territorial waters. It would 
consider entry illegal and passage as non-innocent, deeming the intended ‘unloading of … 
person[s] contrary to … the immigration laws … of the coastal state’ as ‘prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security’ of the country concerned.123 The right of the coastal state to 
‘adopt laws and regulations … relating to innocent passage’, particularly ‘in respect of … the 
prevention of infringement of … immigration … laws’,124 would be invoked, and the explicit 
‘rights of protection of the coastal state’ conferred by UNCLOS relied on. Indeed, Article 25 
of the Convention allows coastal states to take whatever ‘necessary steps in its territorial sea 
to prevent passage which is not innocent’.125 Further, if the conduct of SAR NGOs purporting 
to enter territorial waters and proceed to port was considered to amount to migrant smuggling 
or the facilitation of irregular entry, the coastal state could rely on the Smuggling Protocol to 
adopt such measures as considered necessary to establish criminal liability,126 possibly 
including the opening of investigations and the impoundment of NGO ships. 
Yet, the question emerges as to whether NGOs requesting access to ports to 
disembark rescued persons can be characterized as non-innocent passage. It is worth noting, 
in this connection, that passage ‘rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the 
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purpose of rendering assistance’ ought not to be disqualified as non-innocent.127 Rescue 
fundamentally involves such rendering of assistance and thus aligns with the ‘elementary 
considerations of humanity’ underpinning the entire law of the sea regime.128 The ‘delivery to 
a place of safety’ is explicitly required by the international maritime conventions regulating 
SAR (in legally binding form) in accordance with which ‘passage shall take place’.129 
According to the text of UNCLOS, coastal state powers to regulate non-innocent passage are 
not unfettered. They must conform not only with the UNCLOS provisions, but also with 
‘other rules of international law’ that may be relevant—including SAR rules.130 Moreover, 
after six days adrift, the MV Lifeline was itself in a situation that arguably reached the 
threshold of distress. This triggered a separate (customary) right of refuge in the nearest 
(safe) port in favour of the MV Lifeline that Malta was required to respect.131  
A further doubt arises as to whether subsequent entry to port, as in the MV Lifeline 
case, can be considered as constitutive of the criminal offences of the captain abetting 
unauthorised immigration or of contributing to migrant smuggling or human trafficking.132 
Since there was no intent on the part of the captain, no financial gain whatsoever, and no 
discernible connection to any organised crime ring, the constitutive elements of the crime 
under the Smuggling Protocol cannot be established.133 The absence of exploitation also 
disqualifies the applicability of the Trafficking Protocol.134 Importantly for the captain’s 
liability, because the transposition of these crimes into Maltese law requires similar 
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conditions for the actus reus and mens rea elements to be fulfilled, their commission cannot 
be established under domestic regulations either.135 
In addition, as the rescue operations occurred beyond the territorial waters of Italy 
and Malta, penal jurisdiction over the master or any other crewmember at the service of the 
ship should be understood as expressly reserved to ‘the … authorities either of the flag State 
or of the State of which such person is a national’, pursuant to Article 97 of UNCLOS, on the 
basis that the rescue could be viewed as an ‘incident of navigation’ under that provision and 
not a transnational crime. The emphasis on flag state authority further aligns with the 
recognition of the diverse duties of the flag state in exercising authority over its vessels, 
consistent with Article 92 of UNCLOS. Accordingly, neither Italy nor Malta could validly 
rely on different arrangements adopted under their domestic laws as an excuse not to observe 
this international provision.136 As a result, this brings into question Maltese power to 
prosecute the MV Lifeline’s captain for rescue incidents.  
Finally, with regard to the impoundment of the MV Lifeline in Valetta’s port,137 
Article 97 of UNCLOS may also be relied upon, to the extent it provides that ‘no arrest or 
detention of the ship, even as a measure of investigation, shall be ordered by any authorities 
other than those of the flag State’.138 There is no basis for Malta to claim jurisdiction on this 
point when the incident is framed as a rescue situation on the high seas and, hence, an 
‘incident of navigation’. In exercising jurisdiction purely by reference to the Smuggling 
Protocol, Malta neglects other important international legal principles that are at play. 
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Any accusation that the MV Lifeline was allegedly ‘illegally flying the Dutch 
flag’—an accusation the captain, crew, and NGO headquarters have consistently denied—has 
no bearing on a coastal state’s right to exercise jurisdiction over a vessel that has entered port 
in distress following a rescue.139 The contestation of the MV Lifeline’s flag seems strategic, as 
a move by Malta to find an alternative basis upon which to exercise jurisdiction, 
circumventing flag-state authorisation. In relation to matters regarding registration, it is a 
duty of the flag state to ‘effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control’.140 It is an exclusive 
prerogative of each state—the Netherlands in the case of the MV Lifeline—to ‘fix the 
conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, 
and for the right to fly its flag’.141 No other state can interfere. The only thing UNCLOS 
allows is for ‘[a] state, which has clear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction and control 
with respect to a ship have not been exercised, [to] report the facts to the flag State’. On 
receipt of such report, then, ‘the flag state shall investigate the matter and, if appropriate, 
take any action necessary to remedy the situation’.142 Yet, this does not appear to be the 
procedure followed by Maltese authorities, which seem instead to have selectively adhered to 
its international obligations.143 
3.2 Humanitarian lens  
A humanitarian lens would add a different perspective and take account of the SAR regime 
and human rights and refugee law obligations concurrently applicable to the law of the sea 
and the Smuggling and Trafficking Protocols. This extra layer of law serves to elucidate the 
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sustainability of the accusation on the MV Lifeline ‘of breaking international law by picking 
up migrants off the Libyan coast’.144 Are NGOS forbidden from conducting rescues? Can 
states deliver binding orders on rescuing ships to hand over rescued persons to the authorities 
of an unsafe country? Can disembarkation be denied without regard to human rights?  
The suggestion that rescue by civil-society organisations somehow requires prior 
approval by coastal states is a relatively new development in the Central Mediterranean. Italy 
reacted to NGOs’ involvement in SAR by requiring them to commit to a controversial Code 
of Conduct in mid-2017,145 while Malta has withdrawn landing rights to NGO assets to 
operate from the island, de facto disallowing their rescue activities.146 No explicit legal 
argumentation has been made available in either case, which would explicate Italy and 
Malta’s position. Presumably, both countries implicitly rely on the fact that the SAR regime 
creates duties on coastal states, regarding coast watching and search and rescue of persons in 
distress, as a basis to invoke a right to control how SAR is performed within their respective 
SRR. Moreover, they also presumably rely on ambiguities around disembarkation—in the 
absence of clear rules, they seem to believe they can set any requirements for how and when 
boats can disembark rescuees in their sovereign territory. 
Yet, the obligation under UNCLOS on coastal states is to ‘promote the 
establishment, operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue 
service regarding safety on and over the sea’.147 There is no wording in support of a reading 
of this clause to the effect that such ‘promotion’ need be understood as an exclusive power of 
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the coastal state to arrange for SAR—and especially not in a manner that may be detrimental 
to the regime’s rationale. To the contrary, UNCLOS explicitly foresees that SAR 
responsibilities be shared with flag states, on which it places the separate duty to ‘require the 
master of a ship flying its flag … to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of 
being lost [and, crucially, also] to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in 
distress … in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him’.148 The SAR regime 
does not create any new sovereign powers in favour of coastal states, but rather ‘area[s] of 
responsibility’ to be overseen in good faith to preserve the safety of human life at sea.149  
With that in mind, UNCLOS requires shipmasters to proceed to the rescue of 
vessels in distress ‘if informed of their need of assistance’.150 How that information is relayed 
is irrelevant. Both the SAR and SOLAS Conventions make clear that ‘[t]he master of a ship 
at sea which is in a position to … provide assistance on receiving information from any 
source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their 
assistance’. In so doing, their obligation vis-à-vis coastal states is, ‘if possible’, to ‘inform … 
the search and rescue service that the ship is doing so’ (as a matter of fact).151 There is no 
prerequisite for shipmasters to seek prior permission to proceed. To the contrary, public 
authorities have an obligation (‘shall’) to ‘facilitate the arrival and departure of ships engaged 
in … rescue [activities]’.152 
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Apart from the general accusation ‘of breaking international law by picking up 
migrants off the Libyan coast’,153 one of the objections levelled against the MV Lifeline’s 
conduct, mentioned above, is that the captain purportedly ‘ignore[d] instructions of the 
responsible authority, i.e. the Libyan Coast Guard’.154 This allegation is based upon the 
refusal of the Italian MRCC to coordinate the SAR operation, instead referring the captain to 
the Libyan authorities who ultimately indicated the ‘Port of Tripoli’155 for disembarkation.  
Two issues intertwine in this chain of events: first, whether a country, other than 
the flag state, whether Italy, Libya, or Malta, can deliver (binding) ‘instructions’ to a vessel 
on the high seas in the context of a SAR operation; and, second, if so, whether there are any 
limits as for the subject matter of those instructions and their foreseeable effects. These 
questions have been addressed with regard to the Italian Code of Conduct for NGOs 
operating within its SRR.156 And a similar conclusion can be reached in the current context. 
Due to the prohibition on any state claiming sovereignty over the high seas, no jurisdictional 
powers, different from those explicitly recognised by UNCLOS or other relevant 
international treaties, can validly be established to deliver orders with legal effect to foreign 
ships.157 Freedom of navigation and the rule of exclusive flag-state jurisdiction support this 
interpretation.158 What is more, in the specific context of SAR interventions, the SOLAS 
Convention makes clear that no ‘other person … shall … prevent or restrict the master of the 
ship from taking or executing any decision which, in the master’s professional judgement, is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 ‘Malta detains second migrant rescue ship as hundreds die at sea’, The New Arab, 3 July 2018 
<https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/7/3/malta-detains-rescue-ship-as-hundreds-die-at-sea>.   
154 Malta RCC email to MV Lifeline, 24 June 2018 (on file with the authors).  
155 Libyan Navy email to MV Lifeline, 25 June 2018 (on file with the authors).  
156 Gombeer and Fink (n 145), 15 ff.  
157 UNCLOS, Art 89. 
158 UNCLOS, Arts 90 and 92(1). 
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necessary for safety of life at sea’.159 Such level of discretion is essential to respond promptly 
and adequately to changing circumstances. 
Therefore, as Gombeer and Fink have noted, on the high seas, contrary instructions 
could only be considered as ‘requests for cooperation’, intended to foster compliance with 
SAR obligations. Indeed, ‘the search and rescue service concerned … has the right to 
requisition [assisting] ships [so that they] render assistance’ and ‘it shall [then] be the duty of 
the master [of the ship] requisitioned to comply with the requisition by continuing to proceed 
with all speed to the assistance of persons in distress’.160 But that does not seem to allow for 
the a contrario reading of an implicit power to impede or prohibit SAR by NGO vessels—
especially where they are objectively ‘best able to render assistance’.161 At most, the state 
with responsibility for the SAR region in which the vessel is located could seek to issue 
orders to a master of a vessel on the basis that the state concerned is fulfilling its primary 
responsibility to ensure cooperation in disembarking survivors and delivering them to a place 
of safety.162 In case of any dispute, a MRCC may denounce non-cooperative behaviour on the 
part of the foreign vessel concerned to its flag state, but can claim no enforcement powers of 
its own.163 So, for Italy and Malta to claim disobedience by the MV Lifeline captain when on 
the high seas as the basis for his prosecution has no grounding in international law.  
However, this is different from the question of whether orders (intended as such) 
may amount ‘to acts of [the contracting state’s MRCC] authorities [adopted onshore but] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 SOLAS, Annex, Ch V, Reg 34-1 (emphasis added). 
160 SOLAS, Annex, Ch V, Reg 33(2) (emphasis added). According to SAR, Annex, para. 5.3.3.5: ‘Upon the 
declaration of the distress phase, the rescue co-ordination centre … shall request at an early stage any help 
which might be available from aircraft, vessels or services not specifically included in the search and rescue 
organization, considering that, in the majority of distress situations in ocean areas, other vessels in the vicinity 
are important elements for search and rescue operations’ (emphasis added). 
161 Ibid. 
162 SAR Convention, Annex, para. 3.1.9 (2004 Amendments). 
163 Gombeer and Fink (n 145) 17.  
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which produce effects outside its own territory’,164 thus triggering human rights jurisdiction 
capable of leading to the establishment of responsibility of the state concerned.165 ‘What is 
decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and control over the person in 
question’.166 But direct contact is not always necessary—instances of ‘contactless control’ 
have been adjudged to be relevant as well.167 The focus should be on the content and effect of 
the acts concerned.168  
As regards the content of instructions, in line with Gombeer and Fink’s findings, 
these cannot be such as to contravene the purpose of the SAR regime—which is to preserve 
the integrity of human life at sea.169 Nor can they violate the prohibition of refoulement, the 
right to life, the ‘right to gain effective access to the procedure for determining refugee 
status’,170 and associated procedural protections against arbitrary or collective expulsion—
none of which are guaranteed at the hands of Libyan authorities, neither on board LYCG 
vessels nor on dry land.171  
The foreseeable effects of the instructions given by MRCC Rome first—
relinquishing responsibility and requiring the MV Lifeline to liaise with the LYCG instead—
and the subsequent instructions by RCC Malta to the same effect, are essential factors in 
assessing the possible risks of refoulement and related guarantees. Both countries ‘knew or 
ought to have known’ that such course of action would lead survivors to being taken back to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 ECtHR, Drozd & Janousek v. France and Spain, Appl. 12747/87, 26 June 1992, para. 91; ECtHR, Loizidou 
v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Appl. 15318/89, 23 March 1995, para. 62. 
165 For an elaboration, see Moreno-Lax (n 60) ch 8 and references therein. 
166 ECtHR, Al-Skeini v. UK, Appl. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, para. 136. 
167 ECtHR, N.T. & N.D. v. Spain, Appls 8675/15 and 8697/15, 7 July 2015, para. 54, on the effect of the Melilla 
fence; and ECtHR, Women on Waves v. Portugal, Appl. 31276/05, 3 February 2009, on a ‘contactless’ blockade 
at the rim of Portuguese territorial waters. 
168 Cf. The HRC speaks of ‘impact’ of state conduct on the rights of all persons subject to its jurisdiction, that is, 
‘all persons over whose enjoyment of the right[s] [concerned] it exercises power’, including ‘persons located 
outside any territory effectively controlled by the State, whose [rights are] nonetheless impacted by its military 
and other activities’ (emphasis added), in General Comment No. 36 (n 57), para. 63. This provides a much 
broader scope of actions and omissions that may trigger responsibility under international law. 
169 Gombeer and Fink (n 145), 18.  
170 Amuur (n 62), para. 43; M.S.S. (n 63), para. 216; Hirsi (n 68), para. 133 et seq. 
171 See reports by OHCHR and others (n 100).  
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Libya.172 Acting in the knowledge that the life or integrity of persons in distress will be 
threatened, if delivered to the authorities of an unsafe country, is sufficient to infringe the 
positive, due diligence obligations attaching to rights of ‘boat migrants’ directly affected by 
the instructions at issue.173 The same applies to a denial of permission to disembark, which 
may foreseeably endanger those on board the rescuing ship and nullify ancillary procedural 
entitlements. Although coastal states may not bear full responsibility to provide for a place of 
safety within their own territory under the SOLAS and SAR Conventions, the need to allow 
for disembarkation may arise out of the necessity to honour human rights.174 State SAR 
obligations intersect with human rights and refugee law responsibilities, which constrain 
sovereign discretion and limit the options left for choice of action.175 Neither Italy nor Malta 
could legitimately indicate (directly or indirectly) a transfer of survivors to the LYCG 
authorities without thereby violating their human rights obligations. 
In sum, the ‘closed ports’ strategy, as part of the wider criminalisation of solidarity 
with ‘boat migrants’ expressed by SAR NGOs and others, is unsustainable under 
international law. It follows a highly selective understanding of the law of the sea provisions 
and ignores parallel obligations concurrently applying in situations of distress. A much better 
approach is the one followed by the French Constitutional Court, recognising in a historic 
first that ‘Fraternity’ has constitutional force, alongside ‘Liberty’ and ‘Equality’—the triad of 
values underpinning the French foundational text binding the French legislator. According to 
the Court, acts of mutual aid undertaken for humanitarian purposes cannot be punished or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 M.S.S. (n 63), paras 258-259, 263, 358-359, and 366-367; and Hirsi (n 68), paras 118, 123, 125-126, 156-
157.  
173 On the importance of knowledge of foreseeable consequences, see Moreno-Lax and Giuffré (n 69), referring 
to M.S.S. (n 63) and Hirsi (n 68).  
174 See also ECtHR, Leray v. France, Appl. 44617/98, 16 January 2001, where the Strasbourg court concluded 
that SAR operations are susceptible of judicial review in light of the right to life. For an elaboration, see L.-M. 
Komp, ‘The Duty to Assist Persons in Distress: An Alternative Source of Protection against the Return of 
Migrants and Asylum Seekers to the High Seas?’, in Moreno-Lax and Papastavridis (n 1) 236. 
175 S. Trevisanut, ‘Is There a Right to be Rescued? A Constructive View’, (2004) 4 QIL 3, 9-11. See also 
Moreno-Lax (n 37). Cf. E. Papastavridis, ‘Is There a Right to be Rescued? A Skeptical View’, (2004) 4 QIL 17. 
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repressed, irrespective of the status of the persons helped, even where that results in their 
irregular entry into national territory without authorisation.176 A similar approach should 
guide legislators and prosecutors across jurisdictions when confronted with ‘boat migration’ 
situations in the Mediterranean and beyond. 
4. The Australian Containment Approach: The SIEV 885 Case 
Australia’s experience provides a further example of what happens when a security-framed 
approach to ‘boat migration’ is taken to its logical conclusion. The recent moves by Italy and 
Malta to close their ports to the MV Lifeline discussed above echo the Australian 
government’s response to the MV Tampa back in 2001.177 The decision to block the MV 
Tampa from accessing the Australian port of Christmas Island to disembark 433 asylums 
seekers rescued at sea was the trigger for Australia’s introduction of a maritime interdiction 
and offshore processing policy that survives to this day.178 The adequacy of related practices 
in light of international obligations is what we turn to analyse hereunder. 
4.1 Operation Sovereign Borders 
The securitised approach has intensified with the introduction of the military-led Operation 
Sovereign Borders in 2013. Thereafter, boats suspected of carrying unauthorised migrants are 
intercepted at sea by Australian border protection vessels.179 The priority is blocking access 
to Australian territory and returning migrants to their point of departure. The way in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Conseil Constitutionnel, Décision n° 2018-717/718 QPC du 6 juillet 2018. See also ‘France’s Top Court 
Shows Us That Helping Migrants Is Not a Crime’, Human Rights Watch, 10 July 2018 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/10/frances-top-court-shows-us-helping-migrants-not-crime>.   
177 For a detailed analysis of the incident, see M. Crock and D. Ghezelbash, ‘Do Loose Lips Bring Ships?: The 
Role of Policy, Politics and Human Rights in Managing Unauthorised Boat Arrivals’, (2010) 19 Griffith Law 
Review 238. 
178 Offshore processing and maritime interdiction were used until 2007. Offshore processing was reintroduced in 
2012, and maritime interdiction in 2013 as part of Operation Sovereign Borders discussed below. For an 
analysis of maritime interdiction and offshore processing between 2001 and 2007, see Ghezelbash (n 6) ch 5. 
179 ‘The Coalition’s Operation Sovereign Borders Policy’, Liberal Party of Australia and The Nationals (July 
2013) <http://sievx.com/articles/OSB/201307xxTheCoalitionsOSBPolicy.pdf>. Note that this is a cached 
version as the original policy document was removed from the Party websites at the start of the 2016 election 
campaign. 
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this is achieved varies, based on the country to which return is being sought. Push-backs to 
Indonesia involve leaving migrants on the edge of Indonesian territorial waters, either in their 
own boat or Australian provided lifeboats.180 Migrants are then provided with instructions 
and enough fuel and supplies to make it back to shore in Indonesia.181 This approach is 
necessitated by the fact that Indonesia does not consent to the push-back operations and thus 
any incursion into its waters by Australian authorities would constitute a breach of 
Indonesian sovereignty.182 In contrast, cooperation from Sri Lanka and Vietnam is more 
forthcoming in respect to facilitating returns, with ‘consensual’ arrangements in place for the 
return of people from those countries who are intercepted at sea.183  
As the case study examined in this section explores further, it will, however, not 
always be possible to return intercepted migrants. Where this is the case, they are brought to 
Australia and then promptly transported by plane to one of Australia’s Pacific offshore 
processing centres.184 After a hiatus of approximately five years, Australia reopened the 
facilities on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea (‘PNG’) and the tiny Pacific island nation of 
Nauru in late 2012. Following a PNG Supreme Court decision finding detention at the Manus 
facility unlawful, Australia announced the closure of that centre and suspension of future 
transfers to PNG.185 As such, any future boat arrivals that cannot be returned to their point of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180  Schloenhardt and Craig (n 3) 548. 
181  See the details of push-back operations collated from media reports in Schloenhardt and Craig (n 3), 550-89. 
182 The return of migrants by a warship or coast guard vessel to the territorial sea of another state, without 
authorisation, does not fall under the exception of innocent passage. See Section 2.1 above.  
183 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia and the Government of Sri Lanka 
concerning Legal Cooperation against the Smuggling of Migrants, 9 November 2009 
<https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/FOI/Documents/MOU%20with%20Sri%20Lanka%20on%20the
%20Smuggling%20of%20Migrants.PDF>; The MOU between Australia and Vietnam is not publically 
available, but see ‘Australia and Vietnam further Cooperation to Stamp out People Smuggling’, Ministry of 
Home Affairs Media Release, 12 December 2016 
<https://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/peterdutton/Pages/Australia-and-Vietnam-further-cooperation-to-stamp-
out-people-smuggling.aspx>.  
184 For a detailed examination of Australia’s offshore processing policies, see B. Opeskin and D. Ghezelbash, 
‘Australian Refugee Policy and its Impacts on the Pacific’, (2016) 36 Journal of Pacific Studies 73. 
185 Namah v Pato [2016] PJSC 13 (Supreme Court of Justice, Papua New Guinea); M. Turnbull and P. O’Neill 
Joint Press Conference, 8 April 2017 <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2017-04-08/joint-press-conference-hon-
peter-oneill-cmg-mp-prime-minister-papua-new-guinea>.  
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departure will be transferred to Nauru.186 Australia has made it clear that it does not intend to 
resettle any of the refugees transferred to either of those facilities in Australia. Instead, it has 
entered into agreements with third countries to provide resettlement options.187 The sum 
effect of the push-back and offshore processing policy is to completely block access to 
asylum procedures in Australia for those who travel by boat without authorisation.  
The fate of the passengers on board a vessel labelled as SIEV 885 by the Australian 
government provides an instructive example on how this policy is implemented in practice.188 
The interdiction and push-back component of Australia’s current policies is shrouded in 
secrecy. The government has an explicit policy of not commenting on what it refers to as on-
water ‘operational matters’ for security reasons.189 Given this secrecy, the exact details of 
individual interdiction and push-back operations are difficult to ascertain. Basic questions, 
including exactly where interdictions take place, the amount of time interdictees are detained 
at sea, and what powers the government purports to be acting under, remain unanswered.190 
This creates serious impediments to assessing whether the government’s actions conform 
with domestic and/or international law. SIEV 885 is one of the few examples where this veil 
of secrecy has been pierced. Passengers on board managed to reach a refugee advocate in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Although it should be noted that no arrival has been transferred to PNG or Nauru since July 2014. 
187 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the 
Government of Australia, relating to the Settlement of Refugees in Cambodia, 26 September 2014 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/5436588e4.html>; M. Turnbull and P. Dutton, ‘Refugee Resettlement from 
Regional Processing Centres’, Media Release, 13 November 2016 <https://www.liberal.org.au/latest-
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188 Suspected Irregular Entry Vessels (SIEVs) are allocated an identifying number by the Department in order of 
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189 ‘Scott Morrison says Government won't reveal when asylum seekers boats turned back’, ABC News, 24 
September 2013 <www.abc.net.au/news/2013-09-23/government-won27t-reveal-when-boats-turned-
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proved largely unsuccessful. See Re Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection and Paul 
Farrell [2017] AAT. 
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Australia who briefed lawyers to launch a legal challenge. Details of their journey and the 
Australian government’s response were revealed in the course of the ensuing litigation.191 
On 13 June 2014, the Indian vessel set off from Pondicherry with 157 Sri Lankan 
Tamil asylum seekers aboard.192 Their plan was to travel to Australia’s offshore territory of 
Christmas Island, 1,550 Km northwest of the mainland.193 Approximately two weeks into the 
journey, the vessel began experiencing engine trouble. One of the passengers called the 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), Australia’s search and rescue agency, and 
requested assistance. AMSA then tracked the boat’s progress and maintained regular phone 
contact over the coming days. Phone calls were also made by a passenger to a number of 
refugee advocates in Australia, updating them and reiterating that the vessel was in distress. 
On 28 June 2014, the Australian government dispatched two border protection vessels to 
respond to the situation. These boats reached the asylum seeker vessel on 29 June 2014. At 
this point, there was an ‘incommunicado’ where the refugee advocates could no longer 
contact the asylum seekers on the vessel, and a refusal from the Minister to confirm the 
existence or status of the vessel or the people on it.194 By this time, the SIEV 885 was around 
16 NM from Christmas Island, inside Australia’s contiguous zone.195 The engine had been 
damaged and the vessel was assessed by Australian authorities as being unseaworthy. 
Australian maritime officers boarded and detained the SIEV 885 and all 157 people 
aboard were removed onto the Australian border protection vessel.196 On 1 July 2014, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 CPCF (n 7); ‘Defendants’ Chronology’, Submission in CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection, No S169 of 2014, 30 September 2014; ‘Plaintiff’s Chronology’, Submission in CPCF v Minister for 
Immigration and Border Protection, No S169 of 2014, 11 September 2014. 
192 Defendants’ Chronology (n 191), 2; Originally there were 37 children and 32 women identified among 153 
Tamil asylum seekers on board: Transcript of Proceedings, JARK v Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection [2014] HCATrans 148, at 12; This was later increased to 157 people including 50 children: 
Transcript of Proceedings, CPCF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCATrans 164, at 
6; See also Schloenhardt and Craig (n 3) 556. 
193 Transcript of Proceedings (n 192) 12.  
194 Transcript of Proceedings (n 192) 12-14. 
195 Defendants’ Chronology (n 191), 1; Plaintiff’s Chronology (n 191), 25. 
196 Defendants’ Chronology (n 191), 2-3; Plaintiff’s Chronology (n 191), 1-2.  
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National Security Committee of Cabinet, the peak decision-making body for national security 
in Australia, decided that the detainees should be returned to India, pursuant to Australia’s 
boat turn-back policy, and the Australian vessel travelled towards India for the next 10 days 
with the detainees aboard.197 It arrived near India on 10 July 2014, and waited there for 12 
days, while diplomatic negotiations were carried out to facilitate repatriation.198 On 23 July, 
negotiations seem to have broken down, prompting the Australian government to decide to 
take the passengers to Cocos (Keeling) Islands, an Australian external territory in the Indian 
Ocean.199 The passengers disembarked the Australian border protection vessel on 27 July 
2014, after 29 days of detention at sea. During this time, the asylum seekers, including 50 
children, were kept in windowless rooms on the Australian border protection vessel and were 
only allowed outside for three hours a day.200 Families were split up, with fathers held 
separately from their wives and children.201 Immediately after their arrival at Cocos Island, 
the asylum seekers were transferred to the immigration detention facility in Curtin, in remote 
Western Australia.202 Late in the evening of 1 August 2014, the passengers were removed 
from Australia and flown to the regional processing centre on Nauru, where most still 
remain.203 
4.1 Security Lens 
The government’s response to the SIEV 885 was carried out pursuant to legislative 
provisions, which incorporate a number of the security-related enforcement powers found in 
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203 See, e.g., ‘Sri Lankan Asylum Seeker Tells of Terror on Nauru: “If I am Sent back I Will Kill Myself”’, The 
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UNCLOS into domestic Australian law.204 The Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) (MPA) 
authorises the exercise of maritime powers against foreign vessels in Australia’s contiguous 
zone, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect the vessel is involved in a contravention 
of Australian migration laws.205 This is modelled on Article 33 of UNCLOS.206 Once 
enlivened, the legislative provisions provide wide ranging powers purportedly authorising the 
actions initially taken against SIEV 884, including intercepting, boarding,207 searching208 and 
detaining the vessel209 and passengers,210 and moving them to the Australian Border 
Protection vessel.211 Once SIEV 885 had been detained and the passengers transferred to the 
Australian vessel,212 the power under s 72(4) was engaged, authorising detention for the 
purpose of taking a person to a place inside or outside Australia’s migration zone.213 
This was the key legislative provision in dispute when a number of the asylum 
seekers challenged their treatment in the Australian High Court in CPCF.214 While, initially, 
the asylum seekers had sought injunctive relief to prevent their return to Sri Lanka or India, 
the government’s decision to move them to Nauru made this point moot. The case was 
reframed around the issue of wrongful imprisonment. The asylum seekers argued that the 
decision to take them to India was invalid and their detention at sea for almost a month for 
the purpose of facilitating this unlawful. The argument turned on the accepted Australian 
constitutional principle that a statute authorising executive detention must limit the duration 
of incarceration to what is reasonably seen as necessary to affect an identified statutory 
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purpose, which is reasonably capable of being achieved.215 The fact that there was no 
agreement with India to accept disembarkation made the duration of detention uncertain. 
Yet, in a close 4:3 majority decision, the High Court found that the detention of the 
plaintiffs was authorised. Reflecting Australia’s dualist legal system, the case did not directly 
deal with international law, but rather the implementing legislation. The majority justices 
were all of the view that s 72(4) of the MPA did not require certainty of disembarkation at a 
specific destination. Chief Justice French noted that the statute could not be construed as 
authorising ‘futile or entirely speculative taking’. However, it did authorise detention when 
there is knowledge or reasonable belief that the destination country will allow the person to 
enter its territory.216 The ongoing diplomatic negotiations between Australian and Indian 
officials were sufficient to support this requisite reasonable belief. Justice Crennan concurred, 
finding that while removal must be to a reasonable place and within a reasonable time, s 
72(4) did not require certainty of disembarkation at a specific destination.217 Justice Gageler 
adopted a similar approach, finding that the only limitation on the power was that it be 
exercised reasonably, in good faith, and in accordance with the objects of the Act.218  
4.2 Humanitarian Lens 
Both the government’s actions against the passengers of SIEV 885 and the ensuing legal 
challenge centred around security-related interdiction laws. However, as set out above, 
governments’ responses are also regulated by the international SAR regime, and international 
refugee and human rights law. The MPA is clear that the powers in the Act operate 
independently, and in addition to, any action where the exercise is to ensure the safety of the 
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officers or any other person.219 What follows is, accordingly, a brief examination of what 
Australia’s response would have looked at, if it had framed its interaction with the passengers 
through a SAR or refugee and human rights lens, inspired by the systemic integration 
paradigm. 
Australia is a party to both the SOLAS and SAR Conventions.220 The fundamental 
duty to rescue persons in distress at sea is implemented in domestic law through the 
Navigation Act 2012 (Cth). The duty applies to masters of government and border protection 
vessels,221 but certain navy vessels are exempt.222 AMSA is the statutory authority established 
to satisfy Australia’s obligations to provide rescue services under the SOLAS and SAR 
Conventions.223 It was AMSA that initially coordinated the response to SIEV 885, after the 
authority received a number of distress calls from the vessel. The response thus began as a 
SAR event, with two border protection vessels deployed to respond to the calls. The 
government presumably purports that the rescue came to an end when the rescuees were 
transferred aboard the Australian ship. Details in relation to how rescues are to be performed 
are not set out in legislation. Rather, they are included in the National Search and Rescue 
Manual (NATSAR).224 This is an administrative instrument promulgated by the National 
Search and Rescue Authority Council. It is recognised by the Australian Defence Force as a 
‘standard procedure guide’ and ‘authoritative instruction on SAR best practice’.225 Reflecting 
the position in international law, the manual provides that a rescue terminates when the 
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survivors are removed to a ‘place of safety’.226 However, the meaning of the term is not 
specified. 
The designation of a rescue vessel as a place of safety is questionable under 
international law, where the concept remains ill-defined and subject to divergent state 
practice.227 As noted previously, the IMO Guidelines describe a place of safety as a location 
where rescue operations are considered to terminate, and where the basic human needs of 
survivors to food, shelter, and medical treatment can be met.228 The 2004 amendments of the 
SAR and SOLAS Conventions state that survivors are to be ‘disembarked from the assisting 
ship and delivered to a place of safety.’229 This appears to imply that the assisting ship cannot 
be a ‘place of safety’. The IMO Guidelines recognise that a rescue vessel at sea may be 
deemed as ‘a temporary place of safety’,230 fulfilling that function ‘until the survivors are 
disembarked’,231 but making clear that ‘an assisting ship should not be considered a place of 
safety based solely on the fact that the survivors are no longer in immediate danger once 
aboard the ship’.232 This is why many commentators interpret these provisions as requiring 
that rescuees be taken to landfall.233 While a rescue ship may be a provisional place of safety, 
transfer onto that vessel will not terminate the rescue, which only concludes upon 
disembarkation.234 On this reading, Australia’s enforcement actions against SIEV 885 were 
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unlawful. And, as such, Australia did not have the authority to exercise interdiction powers 
until after the rescue operation had come to an end.235 
Assuming a ship cannot be a place of safety, then, where should the Australian 
government have taken the rescuees for disembarkation? This is again a vexing issue under 
international law. There is no clear duty on flag or coastal states to accept disembarkation of 
rescued persons, but international human rights and refugee law obligations impose limits on 
the choices available. The Australian territory of Christmas Island would have been the most 
obvious option, given that it was only 16 NM away from the location of rescue. However, 
there is nothing in the international SAR regime directly mandating such course of action. 
The 2004 amendments to the SOLAS and SAR Conventions again provide some clarity, but 
did not go as far as mandating specific modalities. They do require contracting governments 
to arrange for ‘disembarkation to be effected as soon as reasonably practicable’ and to do it in 
a way that ‘does not further endanger the safety of life at sea’.236 Australia’s actions in 
holding the rescuees at sea for 29 days while attempting to disembark them in India are 
difficult to reconcile with this requirement. One complicating factor is that the waters 
surrounding Christmas Island in which the rescue of SIEV 885 occurred fall under 
Indonesia’s SRR. This is significant, as the 2004 amendments assign ‘primary responsibility’ 
for organising disembarkation to the government responsible for the SRR.237 This raises the 
peculiar situation in which Indonesia was responsible for coordinating the disembarkation of 
rescuees picked up 16 NM from Australia’s shores by Australian government vessels.238 
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International human rights and refugee law provides for additional protections that 
were relevant to Australia’s treatment of the rescuees aboard SIEV 885 and the 
disembarkation decision. The non-refoulement obligations contained in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and a number of human rights treaties place additional constraints on where 
rescuees may be taken. These principles have crossed over into the SAR regime, with the 
IMO Guidelines confirming that asylum seekers rescued at sea should not be disembarked in 
territories where they may face a well-founded fear of persecution.239  
Reports indicate that Australia was initially considering returning the rescuees to 
Sri Lanka. This would have likely breached Australia’s non-refoulement obligations, given 
the fears articulated by the rescuees about being returned to that country.240 The decision to 
attempt disembarkation in India was also problematic. There is no evidence that any of the 
rescuees feared direct harm in India. However, that is not in itself enough to absolve 
Australia of its non-refoulement obligations—including concomitant procedural guarantees. 
For this to happen, prior to any removal action, the Australian government would have to be 
satisfied—through individual procedures meeting fair trial standards conducted by 
Australia241—that the rescuees would be afforded ‘effective protection’ in India. In turn, such 
‘effective protection’ requires, in particular, that there be ‘guarantees of protection from 
refoulement, fair and efficient procedures for the determination of refugee status, and respect 
for human rights’ in each individual case.242 It is unlikely that India can be considered to 
offer such protection because it has not signed the Refugee Convention, nor does it have any 
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procedures for processing refugee claims. The application of the principle of non-refoulement 
does not translate to a general right to asylum or entry.243 However, in order to comply with 
the principle, states must have procedures in place to identify persons in need of protection—
which must be conducted by the competent authorities under proper conditions (on dry 
land).244 Evidence tendered in relation to the CPCF litigation indicated that Australia failed to 
provide such procedures.245 Rescuees were at no stage provided with any effective 
opportunity to be heard. While they were asked basic biographical details, they were not 
asked why they left Sri Lanka or if they feared being returned there or to India.246  
A human rights focused response from Australia would have precluded prolonged 
detention at sea. This detention was almost certainly arbitrary, in violation of Article 9 of the 
ICCPR.247 While detention for immigration related purposes is permissible in certain 
circumstances, it requires an individualised assessment as to whether detention is ‘reasonable, 
necessary and proportionate’ in every given case.248 This must be reassessed as detention 
extends in time and remains subject to judicial review.249 Moreover, in order for detention to 
not be arbitrary, its duration must be predictable.250 Given the open-ended nature of 
discussions relating to disembarkation, this predictability did not exist. In addition, the 
conditions of the prolonged detention at sea may also have breached the prohibition of ‘cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ under Article 7 of the ICCPR and the 
requirement in Article 10(1) that ‘all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with 
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’. As discussed above, 
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the migrants were separated from their families and held in windowless rooms for 21 hours a 
day for the duration of their 29 days of detention at sea.251 
Australia’s response to ‘boat migration’ is framed almost exclusively as a matter of 
national security. The government attempts to justify its actions with reference to its security-
related interdiction powers under the law of the sea and corresponding domestic legislation. 
The treatment of the passengers aboard SIEV 885 illustrates how this framing plays out in 
practice—157 men, women and children detained in unduly harsh conditions at sea for close 
to a month, while the Australian government deployed all its diplomatic resources in a bid to 
ensure they would not be brought to Australia. The government’s securitised response 
sidelines the other international legal regimes that are relevant, such as the SAR regime and 
international human rights and refugee law. While arguably authorised under its security-
related interdiction powers, Australia’s actions were not in step with its broader obligations 
under these other regimes. An integrated approach to Australia’s obligations under 
international law would have necessitated the immediate transfer of the rescuees to the 
Australian territory of Christmas Island. This was the closest place of safety on land at which 
disembarkation could bring the rescue to an end. Only then could enforcement powers be 
exercised. It is noteworthy that the fate of the asylum seekers would have most likely been 
the same in the end, with them being transferred to Australia’s offshore processing sites in 
PNG and Nauru. However, the integrated approach would have prevented their extended 
detention at sea, which was not only arbitrary, but potentially amounted to inhuman treatment 
and was contrary to the need to respect the inherent dignity of detainees. 
 
5. Conclusion 
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These two case studies place in sharp relief how different bodies of international law interact 
and may be brought to bear in particular factual scenarios. Fragmentation of international law 
is at risk when states select which body of international law applies, or prevails, in 
responding to individual situations on account (only) of security or other national concerns.252 
Beyond risks to the normative structure of international law, far more problematic is that 
selective application of international law results in the commission of internationally 
wrongful acts,253 eroding the good faith foundation of the entire system,254 and ultimately 
translating into a life or death difference for ‘boat migrants’. 
In highlighting the humanitarian lens for each of our case studies, we have shown 
that it does not have to be this way. The normative structures of international law provide 
answers in reconciling the different legal regimes at stake, including via systemic 
integration.255 Our case studies could have had very different outcomes as a result. In relation 
to the MV Lifeline, we have shown that Malta should have permitted the entry of the vessel 
into port. Moreover, in pursuing the criminal prosecution of the captain and seizure of the 
vessel under the Smuggling Protocol and its national law, the requirements and expectations 
of the SAR regime have been thoroughly undermined. For the SIEV 885 case, Australian 
decision-making by both government officials and the Australian High Court effectively 
prioritised border control over any proper regard for human rights. 
The policy imperatives of states like Italy, Malta, and Australia clearly do not 
favour a humanitarian lens as a response to SAR and ‘boat migration’. Nonetheless, in 
highlighting the alternative perspectives, we have sought to ensure that there is a path 
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forward to integrate all international law obligations that concurrently apply in the maritime 
context. This shift in focus is essential for any country committed to a rules-based 
international order, as both Australia and the European Union (as well as its Member States) 
profess to do.256 ‘[T]he special nature of the maritime environment’, as asserted by the 
European Court of Human Rights, ‘cannot justify an area outside the law where ships’ 
[captains] crews [and passengers] are covered by no legal system capable of affording them 
enjoyment of the[ir] rights’.257 Italy has recognised, in its case against India under the 
UNCLOS dispute settlement procedures, that ‘considerations of humanity and international 
standards of due process apply to the law of the sea’.258 And so much is true not only for 
Italian nationals, but for any person facing danger or distress at sea.  
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